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 I. Introduction 
Public diplomacy is a term frequently used in recent years both in 
international relations circles and the media.  Only during that time has it become 
an accepted part of the foreign policy machine within government, but as a 
concept public diplomacy has existed for much longer.  Whether called 
psychological operations (as it is in the U.S. military) or information 
dissemination (as within organizations such as the U.S. Information Agency) 
public diplomacy has been exercised for decades.  With the establishment of high 
profile positions for public diplomacy within the U.S. government during the last 
several years, it has become more prominent as a field of practice.  Public 
diplomacy is an essential and underutilized branch of the foreign policy world.  It 
has the potential to improve relationships with other nations, foster understanding 
between cultures, and promote global education and engagement for Americans.  
It also reinforces democratic principles by recognizing public citizens as important 
players in their own countries and on the global stage.  Most importantly, it has the 
ability to accomplish its primary goal: building widespread support for American 
foreign policy. 
In a world of declining American influence and increasing hostility toward 
American policies, public diplomacy will be the lynchpin in any successful foreign 
policy in the coming years.  A rapidly globalizing world has given a voice to 
billions of previously unheard individuals.  These individuals must be the targets 
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of public diplomacy efforts.  Continued democratization around the world means 
more and more that the will of the people will drive government action.  The 
distinction here is important: as a nation, America cannot focus solely on 
garnering support among foreign governments.  We must also win favorability 
with the citizens.  
An important distinction must be made between public diplomacy and 
propaganda.  Very negative connotations surround the idea of propaganda, and 
while both fields are concerned with informational campaigns, public diplomacy is 
based on other components.  Two primary differences separate these fields.  First, 
public diplomacy is not unidirectional.  An important objective is to inform 
foreign audiences of American values, but equally important are efforts to inform 
Americans of foreign opinions.  Second, cultural and educational exchanges are 
crucial areas of public diplomacy, as they prove mutually beneficial to both 
cultures.  Propaganda is not centered on the free exchange of ideas and cultures 
the way public diplomacy is.  Also, the government is not the only player in public 
diplomacy; it is a practice that draws from multinational corporations and private 
citizens, in addition to government entities. 
At the heart of American public diplomacy lie the American people.  With 
their voices positive messages about American life are carried around the world.  
With a government often struggling with public diplomacy, and working with 
declining cultural capital, the people provide a sound alternative to educate a new 
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generation of foreign friends.  Public diplomacy offers a rare arena in which the 
actions of people can make up for the deficiencies of government.  
For centuries, the public was largely excluded from the policy realm, but 
with the advent of liberal democratic societies has come an onslaught of 
information and public opinion.  The story of English diplomat Harold Nicolson is 
well known in international relations because his writings and observations 
capture a shift between old and new diplomacy. Early in his life, as a member of 
the British foreign service, Nicolson was a Wilsonian idealist who viewed the 
League of Nations as the solution to all international problems.1  He accepted 
Satow’s definition of diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the 
conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.”2  
This definition characterizes old diplomacy through its focus on government-to-
government encounters, and was based on a model with a sovereign head of state.  
Let down by the failures of the Wilsonian model, Nicolson began writing as a 
realist who recognized a sort of new diplomacy in which sovereignty lies with the 
people.3  Because of the changing nature of sovereignty, diplomacy itself needed 
                                                 
1 Otte, T.G.  “Nicolson.”  Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger,” 2001, p. 152. 
 
2 Otte, ibid. p. 156. 
 
3 Otte, ibid. p. 157.  
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to adapt: “The conflict between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ diplomacy is…in this long 
process of adjustment,” Nicolson wrote.4   
 Public diplomacy accepts “new” diplomacy and focuses on influencing 
foreign audiences.  While traditional diplomacy continues to play a critical role in 
the international system, public diplomacy responds to public opinion, which is 
very important in societies where the people can vote out public officials.  Viewed 
this way, effective public diplomacy has a trickle-up effect, starting with shaping 
the opinions of the public audience, which then manifests itself in electoral 
outcomes.  Through such actions, state leaders are indirectly targeted by public 
diplomacy.    
 The purpose of this essay is three-fold.  The first section provides history 
and analysis of public diplomacy from 1942-2007, including its structural 
organization within the U.S. government.  The section includes an analysis of how 
public diplomacy has been transformed as the result of the War on Terror.  The 
second section describes the most recent programs and initiatives in American 
public diplomacy.  Thirdly, I offer a section of policy recommendations and 
conclusions, ultimately calling for more indirect approaches to public diplomacy 
in order to improve American credibility.    
Two major problems will be addressed at various points throughout the 
essay.  There is widespread disagreement over what the role of public diplomacy 
                                                 
4 Nicolson, Nigel. The Harold Nicolson Diaries 1907-1963. Orion Publishing Group, London, 
2004. 
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should be exactly.  This disagreement has led to detrimental inconsistencies, most 
obviously in the rapidly shifting structure of the public diplomacy establishment.  
There are also important questions about the scope of public diplomacy.  Is it 
anything more than public affairs or publicity?  There is a fine line between the 
information programs of public diplomacy and propaganda. What characteristics 
of public diplomacy distinguish it as an independent and necessary part of the 
foreign policy process?  These questions will be addressed from various 
perspectives.   
 
II. Public Diplomacy: Structure and Practice 
 The concept of public diplomacy is relatively new, at least compared to age-
old international interactions, such as bargaining, trade and war.  Because of the 
rise of accessible information in the twentieth century, the opinion of foreign 
audiences became increasingly more prominent and influential.  The actual term, 
public diplomacy, was coined and defined in 1965 as the “cause and effect of 
public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of 
foreign policy.”5  Public diplomacy can be broken down into three different 
functions: information programs, educational exchanges and cultural exchanges.  
This section offers an examination of some important attempts at public 
                                                 
5 Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University first coined 
the term during the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy.  The 
term was first used in the 1965 Fletcher School catalogue.  United States Information Agency, 
USIA:  A Commemoration, 26.  
 
 6 
diplomacy by the U.S. government and the structure of the public diplomacy 
establishment within the government, beginning with an overview of some 
programs that are widely known, if not widely understood as efforts in public 
diplomacy.   
 
Public diplomacy: information programs and cultural exchange 
America’s first experiment with public diplomacy was part of the strategic 
communications tactics that helped the U.S. and its European allies defeat Axis 
troops.  It came in the form of a radio program that today is known around the 
globe, Voice of America.  In January 1942, the U.S. government began purchasing 
small blocks of time on national broadcast networks to inform listeners about the 
day-to-day events of the war.  Broadcasters made a pledge that the news would be 
honest, whether the news was good or bad.6  At its inception, VOA was organized 
under the Office of War Information, and its programs targeted areas that had 
already fallen under Nazi occupation.  Quickly, the program expanded to various 
markets around the world, often partnering with local media to gain airtime.  
During the war, the American Broadcasting Station was founded in Europe, 
establishing an enduring precedent for the availability of American media in 
                                                 
6 Rugh, William A. American Encounters with Arabs: The "Soft Power" of U.S. Public 
Diplomacy in the Middle East. 2006,  p. 13. 
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Europe. 7   By the end of the war, VOA provided broadcast services in 40 
languages.8
 For a first trial in modern public diplomacy—modern because the 
effectiveness of the entire operation depended upon the relatively new technology 
of radio—Voice of America proved successful.  It is difficult to quantify the role it 
played in winning over audiences worldwide, but America had undoubtedly found 
new and useful methods for effectively disseminating information.  Other 
countries followed, creating their own external broadcasting programs modeled 
after VOA; however, some criticized its objectivity because of its government 
association.  VOA continued doing important work after WWII, taking on 
communist ideology during the Cold War.  Although its effectiveness was 
witnessed in Europe, it still had detractors among those in Congress and the 
mainstream media.  The Associated Press and United Press stopped providing 
news material to VOA, fearing government interference.9  They worried their 
collaboration with a government entity undermined their journalistic credibility.  
 In the early years of the Cold War, an ideological clash developed between 
the foreign policy establishment and politicians, with the latter adopting a more 
traditional view of how diplomacy should be conducted—old diplomacy, to use 
                                                 
7 Dizard, Wilson P. Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency. 2004, 
p. 24 
 
8 Dizard, ibid, p. 25 
 
9 Kugler, David F.  The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953.  p. 2 
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Nicolson’s terminology.  To them, this new realm of public diplomacy, because of 
government oversight, constituted an unnecessary expansion of the federal 
government.  Some Congressional leaders believed that foreign policy mattered 
far less than the domestic political agenda.10  This discord led to various and major 
restructurings of the foreign policy establishment in America, particularly in the 
area of global communications and exchanges.  
 The most well-known public diplomacy program is the Fulbright exchange 
program, which, since its creation in 1946, has sent thousands of Americans to 
universities abroad to conduct graduate research or teach.  The program is funded 
through Congressional appropriations and had a budget of $262 million in 2007.  
Although cost is shared by host countries and institutions, the United States 
provides a vast majority of funding.   More than 6,000 grants were awarded in 
2007, sending researchers and teachers to 155 countries.11  The cultural benefit is 
not one-sided; since the program’s inception 46,000 Americans and 150,000 
students from other countries have participated in Fulbright exchanges.  Although 
the program has been an unquestionable success, funding remains limited.  The 
FY 2007 State and Foreign Operations budget request was $35,116,000,000, and 
the total earmarked for educational and cultural exchanges was $474,000,000.12  
In other words, only 1.34% of the requested funds were for educational exchanges, 
                                                 
10 Kugler, ibid, p. 4 
 
11 http://us.fulbrightonline.org/about.html
 
12 http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/html/60199.htm
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with Fulbright being the flagship program.  With a proven program such as this 
one, better funding would insure even greater results.  
 
The structure of public diplomacy within the U.S. government 
 The failure to set clear goals for public diplomacy hinders its organization 
and implementation.  Because its scope lacks clear definition, it is difficult to 
organize effectively; on the other hand, because of poor structuring, the scope of 
public diplomacy is ill defined.   
 The strategic communications sector of the national security and foreign 
policy bureaucracy seeks to use communication tactics to further the interests of 
America abroad.  Yet, it is difficult to communicate externally when internal 
organization is unstable.  During the Second World War, three organizations held 
responsibilities within the strategic communications sector: the Office of War 
Information, the Office of Strategic Services (later rechristened the CIA) and the 
division within the Army that practiced psychological warfare.13  The onset of the 
Korean War sparked renewed interest in public diplomacy, but no overarching 
organization existed that would enable it to be used as an effective tool.  President 
Eisenhower provided an intended solution to this organizational problem with the 
creation of the United States Information Agency in 1953.  USIA assumed 
responsibility for broadcasting and information functions; however, the 
                                                 
13 Laurie, Clayton D.  The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany. 
1996. 
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educational and cultural exchange components of public diplomacy continued to 
operate through the State Department.14    
 Voice of America was now under the auspices of USIA, but other 
governmental agencies still had a hand in broadcasting, most notably the CIA, 
which launched radio programs in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (known as 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, respectively).  Of course, CIA involvement 
in these programs was covert.  Because of the various and often competing 
organizations involved in public diplomacy, interagency coordination was 
problematic.  Efforts were made to coordinate public diplomacy efforts through 
the creation of a Psychological Strategy Board, established during the Truman 
years and falling under the control of the National Security Council.  Although the 
Eisenhower administration established a similar policy coordination office through 
the NSC, those efforts fell by the wayside until the Reagan administration.    
 The 1970’s marked a time of significant organizational change to the public 
diplomacy machine, beginning with the exposure of CIA involvement with Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty.  With the possibility that these two broadcast 
networks could be shut down, Congress created a Board for International 
Broadcasting in 1973 to oversee operations.15  During this decade several studies 
                                                 
14 Lord, Carnes.  Losing Hearts and Minds? p. 65 
 
15 Lord, Carnes. Ibid, p. 66 
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and commissions examined and evaluated American public diplomacy.16  As a 
result, major restructuring took place with regard to the educational and cultural 
components of public diplomacy.  Historically, the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs (ECA) within the State Department oversaw cultural and 
educational exchanges.  But in 1977, President Carter removed this bureau from 
State and made it a part of USIA, and also changed the name of USIA to the U.S. 
International Communications Agency.  The new agency redefined the mission of 
public diplomacy.  The primary goal of public diplomacy was still to influence 
foreign audiences and expose them to American culture.  Now, a new, second 
purpose was added de facto through the new International Communications 
Agency: to give Americans “the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures, 
and problems of others, so that we can come to understand their hopes, 
perceptions and aspirations.”17  This exemplifies the ever-changing nature and 
purpose of public diplomacy, especially as it relates to coming and going political 
administrations.  President Carter’s intention was clearly to promote mutual 
understanding, yet his goal of educating Americans about foreign cultures reached 
beyond the generally accepted scope of public diplomacy.   
One positive result of the studies and commissions of the 1970’s was that it 
provided some distance between the government and its attempts at public 
                                                 
16 Roth, Lois.  “Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style of 
Propaganda,”  The Fletcher Forum, Summer 1984. 
 
17 President Jimmy Carter,  “Memorandum for Director, International Communications Agency,” 
March 13, 1978. 
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diplomacy. This separation between policy and information dissemination allowed 
State to focus solely on policy planning and implementation, and the ICA to focus 
on information dissemination and cultural exchange.  The outcome was the 
legitimization of public diplomacy initiatives, which could now be seen as more 
independent, rather than so closely tied up with government policy planners.   
The Stanton Commission was a notable 1970’s study of public diplomacy.  
It made policy recommendations contrary to what President Carter implemented 
through strengthening the International Communications Agency and the 
extraction of educational programs from State.18  The suggestions were founded 
upon one general idea: that if the State Department was responsible for 
information programs, the department would be more accurate and timely in its 
efforts, promoting both accountability and accuracy.  It was not until 1998 that the 
Stanton approach was ultimately adopted.  The U.S. Information Agency (it was 
given back its original name in the previous decade) was folded into the State 
Department.  Voice of America and Radio Free Broadcasts were removed from 
USIA in 1994 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors by an act of Congress.19  Thus, effectively, with the abolition of USIA 
in 1998, State regained the control over ECA, which it had lost twenty years 
before.  Also at this time, Congress created a high-ranking position within State, 
the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs.  This was a step in the 
                                                 
18 Lord, Carnes.  ibid, p. 67 
 
19 Lord, Carnes.  ibid, p. 68. 
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right direction; however, like all cabinet positions the office holder depends on 
who controls the White House.  The organization of public diplomacy was 
streamlined through this decision, but still it lacked cohesive long-term goals and 
methods.  
 
The State Department and public diplomacy 
 The undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs oversees a 
variety of initiatives, including educational and cultural exchanges, and 
international information programs.  On the public affairs side, the State 
Department spokesman reports directly to the undersecretary, meaning that s/he 
has a direct impact on the daily message coming from the department.  
Information provided by the department spokesman is used in domestic and 
international media.  The attention of the undersecretary is divided between these 
two components, although the position was created to heighten the profile of 
public diplomacy and to demonstrate the commitment of a high-level government 
official to its successful operation.  
 Besides the undersecretary, there are in fact hundreds of State Department 
officials whose careers are dedicated to public diplomacy.  They are members of 
the U.S. Foreign Service who chose public diplomacy as their career track (the 
department calls this a career cone—the five cones are made up of officers 
specializing in political, economic, and consular affairs, as well as management 
and public diplomacy).   According to several Foreign Service officers in the 
 14 
public diplomacy cone, training in this specialty is weak when compared to other 
Foreign Service careers.20  All FSO’s spend their first few years working in 
consular affairs, approving visas for foreign students and travelers.  Yet when it 
comes time for a public diplomacy officer to serve in that capacity, there is little 
definition of expectations.  In many ways, this career cone is the catch-all, doing 
pieces of the work that political or economic officers might do, but with a focus on 
public relations. If their focus was truly public diplomacy, they would work solely 
with educational and information programs, and would consult with local media.  
Such grassroots forms of public diplomacy are unique because they target to 
certain audiences.  There should be clear expectations and homogenized efforts 
among public diplomacy officers to provide consistency.  Without such clarity, it 
is challenging to examine the effectiveness of public diplomacy because too much 
is left to the discretion of individual officers. The result is work that is too fluid, 
changing from person to person and administration to administration.  No guiding 
principles or long-term goals are established, and this lack of foresight damages 
the potential of diplomats to consistently impact foreign audiences.  Large 
programs with oversight, such as foreign aid, have had more visible results than 
individual efforts in public diplomacy.  
 
                                                 
20 Based on interviews with several FSO’s, and also one public diplomacy officer, who is a 
University of Tennessee alum and spoke to a class in April 2008.  
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Foreign aid and public diplomacy 
 There are strong ties between the goals of public diplomacy and the billions 
of dollars of U.S. foreign aid spent each year.  Foreign aid is not a type of public 
diplomacy; economic power is classic hard power.  Yet, the goals of foreign aid 
and of public diplomacy are complementary. Both share a commitment to forging 
strong bonds in an effort to foster goodwill and understanding of American culture 
and policies.  
The Marshall Plan was successful in rebuilding Europe and creating strong 
ties with our Western allies.21  It demonstrated America’s commitment to 
providing relief for its friends and to strengthening the global economy.  Agencies 
such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have played a 
critical role in foreign policy for the last half-century.  The Millennium Challenge 
Account, introduced by President Bush in 2002, called for a five-fold increase in 
foreign aid and restructured distribution methods.22  There are four ways in which 
MCA is different from preexisting aid programs.  First, its purpose is aimed at 
economic growth and development and is not tied to other foreign policy 
objectives.  Second, it rewards countries that practice sound economic policies.  
Third, bureaucratic costs are reduced, and fourth, recipients have a greater say in 
implementing the aid programs.  The separation between policy and aid serves to 
                                                 
21 Kunz, Diane. “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of Motives.” Foreign Affairs, 
May/June 1997. 
 
22 Radelet, Steve.  “Will the Millennium Challenge Account Be Different?”  The Washington 
Quarterly, 26-2, pp. 171-187. 
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strengthen both.  It demonstrates altruism on the part of the U.S. government and 
invests more power in recipients of the aid.  Giving more oversight to the people 
shares similarities with the goals of public diplomacy because it assumes that in 
states that are democratic or democratizing, public opinion will influence state 
policies. By empowering people instead of governments, America fosters trust and 
goodwill among those whose governments may be an adversary.  
 Foreign opinion polls reveal that many underdeveloped countries have a 
negative opinion of America and its policies.23  Rather than decreasing our 
engagement with these countries, it is crucial that the U.S. continues to strengthen 
interactions while seeming less focused on its own agenda.  Foreign audiences 
must believe that accepting U.S. aid does not by association mean accepting all 
U.S. policies.  This dilemma is explained well through James Fearon’s concept of 
audience costs.  Fearon examines how domestic political audiences impact a 
nation’s incentive to give in during international disputes24.  While his scholarship 
pertains more to acts of war, his findings ring true when examining public 
diplomacy. His thesis relies heavily on the notion of the democratic peace: “If 
democracies are better able to communicate their intentions and to make 
international commitments, then the security dilemma may be somewhat 
moderated between them.”  In other words, democracies communicate best with 
                                                 
23 Pew Global Attitudes Project. http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252
Foreign opinion of the U.S. bottomed out in 2003, when only 1% of Jordanians had a favorable 
opinion of the U.S. Since then, polls show increased but still very marginal support.  
 
24 Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International 
Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 577-99. 
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other democracies.  One serious problem with American public diplomacy is that 
often, the foreign audience is non-democratic.  Because audience costs are a social 
invention, they depend on the type of government.  Autocratic leaders of Middle 
East countries have few audience costs when they engage in anti-American 
rhetoric.  Even if a majority of their population disagreed with such rhetoric, it 
would have little effect on the country’s government.  Imagine, on the other hand, 
that a leader of a democratic society were to engage in anti-American rhetoric.  
S/he will eventually be judged by their domestic political audience.  
 
How technology has impacted public diplomacy and public opinion 
 Information technology is crucial because it has the capacity to engage 
whole audiences, not just the political elite of a given country.  Wide availability 
of a message can lead to widespread opinions about America.  In August 1994, the 
Washington Times published an article called “The Death of an Agency,” harshly 
critiquing the U.S. Information Agency and its newest approach to disseminating 
information—the Internet: “How many computer whizzes are there in China or 
Burma or Cuba or Tibet, or Russia for that matter?”25  Public diplomacy has a 
long tradition of adopting the latest technology, from radio to film to television 
and most recently the Internet.  The Washington Times may have had a point in 
1994, but over a decade later it is apparent that USIA was ahead of its time.  
                                                 
25 “The Death of an Agency,” Washington Times,  August 11, 1994.  
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Zogby International is well known for providing reliable polling data 
around the world.  Polls released in 2002, 2005 and 2006 reveal a trend concerning 
how America is viewed in the Middle East: 
 
Opinion of the United States (2002) 
 Favorable Unfavorable 
Saudi Arabia 12 87 
Egypt 15 76 
Morocco 38 61 
Jordan 34 61 
Lebanon 26 70 
 
Opinion of the United States (2005) 
 Favorable Unfavorable 
Saudi Arabia 9 89 
Egypt 14 85 
Morocco 34 64 
Jordan 33 62 
Lebanon 32 60 
 
Opinion of the United States (2006) 
 19 
 Favorable Unfavorable 
Saudi Arabia 12 82 
Egypt 14 83 
Morocco 7 87 
Jordan 5 90 
Lebanon 28 68 
 
The data conclude that positive views of America in the Middle East have 
drastically declined.  While this certainly reflects feelings generated by the 
unpopular war in Iraq, these low numbers also indicate that public diplomacy is 
failing in the region.  Although such disapproval is unsettling, those numbers 
provide insight that was unavailable before the advent of the information age.  If 
so many in the Muslim world are dissatisfied with American policy, it is critical to 
understand why before significant improvements can be made to the public 
diplomacy efforts to reshape their opinions.     
The Pew Global Attitudes Project is perhaps the best-known poll that 
gauges public perception of the United States.  The questions cover many topics, 
but touch on opinions of foreign governments and foreign people.  Often 
respondents dislike a country, but like its people. The results for countries such as 
Jordan and Turkey demonstrate an important gap between the negativity 
associated with the U.S. government, as opposed to the American people.  
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Question: What is your opinion of the United States: favorable, unfavorable or 
undecided? 
 
Country Favorable Unfavorable Undecided 
Great Britain 
 
56% 33% 11% 
Egypt 
 
30% 69% 1% 
Jordan 
 
15% 85% 0% 
Turkey 
 
12% 76% 12% 
 
  
Question: What is your opinion of Americans: favorable, unfavorable or 
undecided? 
 
Country Favorable Unfavorable Undecided 
Great Britain 
 
69% 21% 10% 
Egypt 
 
36% 63% 1% 
Jordan 
 
38% 61% 1% 
Turkey 
 
17% 69% 14% 
 
*From the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006.  
 
Public diplomacy relies heavily on the notion of promoting American 
culture and showing foreign audiences the “real” America.  The above data, 
therefore, are encouraging because they demonstrate an opening to convey 
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American values to foreign audiences without directly attaching those values to 
the government.  Walter Russell Mead writes that, “American sweet power, 
though limited and variable, clearly plays an important role in winning sympathy 
and support for American foreign policy around the world.”26 Indeed, there is an 
opportunity for public diplomacy to contribute to improved approval numbers for 
America.  Ideally, convergence in the two above data sets would indicate 
successful public diplomacy.  Once foreign audiences look favorably upon the 
government and the American people, it will be less important to detach public 
diplomacy initiatives from the government because of lack of popularity.  
The greatest downside to polls conducted by the Pew Center is that the data 
are so comprehensive it takes several years to compile and release, resulting in 
sometimes outdated information.  More rapid polling information would allow 
public diplomatists to quantify improvements in opinion polls as they relate to 
public diplomacy.  Yet, having this information is an advantage over what was 
known about worldwide perception of America a generation ago.  Because 
improvements in technology and communication have allowed better access to a 
diverse array of media and information resources, the discipline of diplomacy has 
changed how it envisions its tasks and performs its functions.  No longer is 
diplomacy strictly conceived of in the traditional sense of government-to-
government negotiations. 
                                                 
26 Mead, Walter Russell. Power, Terror, Peace and War: America’s Grand Strategy in a World 
at Risk.  p. 39-40 
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 What we learn from the structure of public diplomacy 
 The structure of the public diplomacy shop within the foreign policy 
establishment is revealing of its place on the diplomatic priority list.  Public 
diplomacy is faced with definitional problems that do not exist in policy planning 
or diplomatic management.  There are strict guidelines for how embassies are run; 
there is a process in place for creating and implementing policy; the resources the 
State Department provides to Americans and foreigners is straightforward.  Public 
diplomacy itself, however, is not straightforward.  
Those with a more traditional, realist perspective of international relations 
question the effectiveness of soft power altogether.  Realists believe hard power 
and self-interest are the key determinants to creating policy.  Decisions are 
instinctively made based on the best outcome for the decision-maker.  Hans 
Morgenthau argued that “rational foreign policy [is] good foreign policy; for only 
rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, 
complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of 
success.”27  The focus of the foreign policy establishment continues to be military 
and economic power, not cultural power.  Until a happy medium can be found 
between hard and soft power—which is difficult due to constantly changing 
                                                 
27 Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
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circumstances in the world environment—the role of public diplomacy will remain 
unclear.  
 The constant restructuring and reorganization over the past sixty years tells 
us that public diplomacy is still finding its place.  As an academic field, it is not 
studied nearly as much as traditional diplomacy and international relations, with 
their focus on military and economic issues.  Only three American universities 
have centers dedicated entirely to the academic study of public diplomacy, George 
Washington University, the University of Southern California, and Tufts 
University28.  If more information were available in academia on this subject, it 
would create a new academic branch of the foreign policy establishment and help 
the field of public diplomacy find its place within international affairs.  Currently, 
the field lacks a strong theoretical framework which more widespread academic 
analysis would provide. 
  
III. Public Diplomacy After September 11 
 Some of the most fascinating and significant developments in the realm of 
public diplomacy have happened since the September 11 attacks.  The changes 
result from a world altered by terrorism, but also by a global society vastly 
improved thanks to technological advancements. Christopher Ross, who is a 
                                                 
28 The Public Diplomacy Council and The Public Diplomacy Institute, The George Washington 
University, http://www.pdi.gwu.edu/; University of Southern California Center for Public 
Diplomacy, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/; The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public 
Diplomacy, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/
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special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs at the State 
Department, provides a vivid description of how public diplomacy has changed in 
recent years: 
“A full generation ago, for instance, small teams of U.S. Foreign Service 
officers drove Jeeps to the hinterlands of Latin American and other remote 
regions of the world to show reel-to-reel movies to isolated audiences, 
while U.S. diplomats in capital cities scouted out future leaders and sent 
them on exchange programs to experience life, society, and democratic 
values in the United States firsthand.  That world now seems impossibly 
quaint, and the contrast with today’s global environment could hardly be 
more pronounced.”29
 
The rise and spread of American multinational corporations, as well as non-
governmental organizations, have impacted the interaction foreign audiences have 
with “America,” or at least the representations of America they see from their 
various perspectives.  
 In the weeks immediately following the September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Council on Foreign Relations established an 
Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, bringing together prominent 
leaders of the foreign policy community to make suggestions to the U.S. 
government on how to improve America’s image abroad.  The criticisms and 
recommendations found in a November 6, 2001, release from the Council on 
Foreign Relations provide critical insight about where public diplomacy stood at 
the time just before and just after the invasion of Afghanistan.  The task force, less 
than two months into the war, was bold to say that winning the battle for public 
                                                 
29 Ross, Christopher.  “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age.”  The Washington Quarterly: 25-2. pp. 
75-83. 
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support abroad is of equal importance as the military operations in Afghanistan.  
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who co-chaired the task force, made headlines 
when he publicly asked, “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s 
leading communications society?”  His question exposed a difficult truth for the 
American public, as well as policymakers: public diplomacy and international 
communications had failed, and as a result there now existed a large group of 
individuals with an impression of America so negative it was deadly.  
 Suggestions made by the task force were numerous, and some of them 
called for drastic changes to the bureaucracy, which has experienced one change 
after another since WWII.  A few notable suggestions included:30
 Employing modern public relations research and polling techniques 
 Creating a Public Diplomacy Advisory Board, including academics and 
business professionals from a variety of backgrounds, to demonstrate that 
voices from outside the traditional policy establishment are heard 
 Aggressively recruit speakers of Arabic, Dari, Pashto and Farsi into the 
U.S. Government, looking past misplaced security concerns that have 
prevented such recruitment in the past 
 Create a Radio Free Afghanistan broadcast and increase the presence of 
Voice of America in the region 
 
Because the task force made so many recommendations, and called for such 
sweeping changes regarding the practice of public diplomacy, one can reasonably 
conclude that public diplomacy prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was 
only partially effective. It seems that an entire region of the world was neglected, 
and as a result, not exposed to American ideas and values the way foreigners in 
                                                 
30 Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force for Public Diplomacy, November 6, 
2001. 
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friendly parts of the world might have been. This invited frustration and 
resentment toward American policies, and ultimately created an environment 
friendly to extremism based on harming American interests.  Ironically, the 
audiences and the regions most in need of enhanced public diplomacy efforts are 
the ones that share the most ideological differences with America.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to express American messages in a clear and convincing way, without 
seeming to impose a foreign ideology.   
 In 2002, the independent task force released another report, this time more 
critical of American policies: “The United States will need to modify not simply 
the implementation of its foreign policies but, in certain cases, the foreign policies 
themselves.”31  The task force’s most important observation concerning public 
diplomacy centered on credibility.  Essentially, it argued that America lacks 
credibility in the Middle East, and that allies with more credibility must be used to 
send American messages.  Within traditional international relations literature, the 
idea of credible signals was introduced by Thomas Schelling.  He suggests that 
states send signals to one another through their actions, and that in order to be 
effective, these actions must have credibility: “If the commitment is ill-defined 
and ambiguous—if we leave ourselves loopholes through which to exit, our 
opponent will expect us to…exit.”32  The idea itself is intuitive, regardless of 
                                                 
31 Peterson, Peter G.  “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism”  Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2002. 
 
32 Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. “The Art of Commitment.” Arms and Influence.  Yale University 
Press, p. 35-91. 
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whether you are talking about bargaining, negotiations or strategic 
communications.  Shouldn’t public diplomacy, first and foremost, be believable?  
If it is not, all public diplomacy efforts will be ineffective.  The task force 
recommended the following changes in order to improve credibility:33
 Use foreign governments and diplomats to interact with governments that 
may be suspicious of U.S. intentions 
 Employ Arab-American businessmen, professional and celebrities to carry 
messages to the Arab world in order to foster a sense of mutual 
understanding 
 Create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy that would be free from 
government involvement to bridge the gap between public and private 
sector initiatives 
 
Examining public diplomacy policymakers and academics the opportunity to 
evaluate what exactly is working and what is not.  There is little disagreement over 
the fact that in the past, public diplomacy has been mismanaged, overshadowed 
and underestimated, but by viewing public diplomacy in a current context, more 
accurate conclusions can be drawn and policy recommendations can be made. 
New diplomacy should be the rubric used to evaluate the success of American 
efforts.  Similarly, there must be commitment to public diplomacy on the part of 
the U.S. government.  Otherwise, credibility is difficult to achieve.  Kurt Gaubatz, 
a scholar who studies the foreign policies of democratic states as they relate to 
commitment, writes, “A state makes a commitment to a course of action when it 
creates a subjective belief on the part of others that it will carry through with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
33 Peterson, Peter G.  “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism”  Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2002. 
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certain course of action.”34  He calls for consistency of methods and purpose.  
Such consistency would render public diplomacy more effective.   
Public diplomacy is used to influence foreign audiences, indirectly 
influencing sovereigns of foreign governments; therefore, the opinion of the 
people serves as a measurement of success.  Here is where the U.S-led efforts 
against terrorism stand in terms of public opinion: 
 
Question: Which of the following phrases comes closer to describing your view?  I 
favor the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the U.S.-led efforts to 
fight terrorism.   
 
Country Favor Oppose Undecided 
Great Britain 49% 42% 10% 
Egypt 10% 82% 8% 
Jordan 16% 74% 10% 
Turkey 14% 77% 9% 
*From the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006.   
 
 
 
 We must understand how America is viewed and interpreted around the 
world, but understanding the paradigms of other cultures has proved challenging.  
Neglecting public opinion undermines efforts, yet when public opinion is 
                                                 
34 Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” 
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incongruent with American preferences, a balance must somehow be reached.  
With the “stay the course” policies of the Bush administration, a dangerous 
mindset has taken hold in the policy world that says policies should not change 
according to public opinion.35  Because of this, American policies can be 
construed to be hard-headed, self-interested, irresponsible and even imperialistic 
because of such strong rhetoric.  This is not to suggest that policy should change 
every time there is a shift in opinion polls, but it would be foolish to think that 
policies should never change.  
 From that same perspective, it is important not to misread the data 
presented above.  We cannot assume that respondents do not favor fighting 
terrorism; this poll suggests that they disagree with U.S. tactics, most likely 
because of opposition to the unpopular war in Iraq.  With important national 
security matters such as this, is it more important to achieve our goals or to 
achieve our goals our way?  That truly is a matter of a person’s own worldview, 
but the question pertains to public diplomacy in very real ways.  There is an 
opening for the United States to achieve its goals through surrogates—allies, 
private businesses, individuals—instead of every action being seen as the direct 
decision of the government.  
 
                                                 
35 Telhami, Shibley.  “Reaching the Public in the Middle East”  Engaging the Arab and Islamic 
Worlds through Public Diplomacy.  Public Diplomacy Council, 2004.  
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IV.  Recent Initiatives in Public Diplomacy 
 During her tenure as Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs, Karen Hughes brought about significant changes to public diplomacy. Her 
office produced a quarterly newsletter providing the most up-to-date information 
concerning developments in U.S. public diplomacy.36  Most of the 
recommendations made by more than thirty studies on public diplomacy were 
implemented under her leadership, leading to significant changes in education and 
cultural exchange, as well as informational initiatives. 
 
Changes in education and cultural exchange 
 After September 11, the number of student visas issued to foreign 
university students fell dramatically.  Mostly this was derived from misplaced 
security concerns.  Educational exchanges are more important than ever.  By 
educating a class of young, international students, America has the opportunity to 
make a positive impression and have de facto spokespeople for America return to 
their home country after their exchange.  Undersecretary Hughes made this a top 
priority, and by 2006 the number of student visas issued not only rose to pre-9/11 
levels, but set a new record for the most visas in a year, with 591,000 student visas 
granted.37  A similar commitment has strengthened the Fulbright Program, causing 
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it to reach record levels.  A new Fulbright exchange attracts the world’s best 
scientific minds to study in America. A program called Citizen Dialogue sends 
Muslim Americans overseas to talk with various Muslim communities, and vice 
versa.  More than 600 Muslim scholars have visited the U.S. in the last two of 
years as a result.  Other innovative cultural exchanges involve sending sports icons 
and celebrities to represent America abroad, such as Cal Ripken, Jr., and Michelle 
Kwan38.  
 The State Department refers to education and cultural exchanges as people-
to-people programs, and recently renewed its focus on these grassroots efforts.  
For the first time since 1979, the United States now sponsors people-to-people 
programs with Iran, including meetings between clergy, students, teachers and 
journalists.  Through advocating programs such as these, the State Department 
sends an important message to foreign and domestic audiences: for public 
diplomacy to be effective and make a real difference, it need not be glamorous.  It 
does not have to come in the form of a prestigious educational exchange, like 
Fulbright, and it should not have to involve a perfectly coordinated plan to target 
the media.  Individuals—teachers, lawyers, students, religious leaders—can make 
a significant difference in America’s image abroad.  This concept echoes the calls 
for a new type of public diplomacy, its focus being not only on foreign audiences, 
but also on domestic involvement. 
 
                                                 
38 “Michelle Kwan Accepts Job as Diplomat,” CBS News, November 9, 2006. 
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Improvements to information programs 
 Two important factors in the improvement of the information component of 
the State Department include private sector involvement and the development of 
rapid response units.  The contributions of the private sector during Hughes’ 
tenure totaled over $800 million, more than half the annual budget of the Office of 
the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy.  State has partnered with the private 
sector to provide disaster relief, to establish education and health programs, and to 
make American embassies and airports welcoming to visitors.  This indirect 
approach has greatly expanded the means of public diplomacy and serves to 
demonstrate goodwill on the part of American businesses.  
 A newly-formed Rapid Response Unit constantly monitors foreign media 
on radio, television and the Internet.  This unit immediately sees how America is 
being portrayed around the world, compiles that information in a daily e-mail and 
sends it to thousands of high-ranking government officials, including ambassadors 
and military personnel.  Ignorance is no longer a valid excuse. Along these same 
lines, regional media hubs have been established, allowing Arabic speakers to 
interact with local media on behalf of the American government.  This means that 
an “American perspective” on a number of issues will be delivered in Arabic in 
Middle Eastern media outlets, allowing American surrogates to speak directly to 
foreign audiences instead of through loose translations. 
 A focus on rapid response is evident in this year’s report released by the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors.  There are efforts to create programming to 
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respond to crises and events worldwide: “On September 27, 2007, VOA Burmese 
doubled its daily broadcast from 1.5 to three original hours daily in response to the 
massive nationwide demonstrations against the military junta and the ensuing 
crackdown.”39  Similar adjustments were made in Pakistan when a state of 
emergency was declared in late 2007, and also in Somalia and Zimbabwe during 
recent political and humanitarian crises.  An important addition to the broadcasting 
capability of VOA was the creation of a Persian News Network, which is seen and 
heard by a quarter of Iranians every week.40  This type of reactionary 
programming demonstrates flexibility and a commitment to relating to the events 
in the lives of foreign audiences. 
   
V. Policy Recommendations 
 Many significant adjustments have been made affecting the implementation 
of public diplomacy.  As a result, the government critically evaluated its past 
failures in public diplomacy and tried new tactics.  Of course, not enough time has 
passed to know whether or not these changes will have a positive long-term effect 
on America’s relationship with a number of key allies, especially those in the 
Middle East.  The recommendations offered here are drawn from the many factors 
so far outlined in this essay. 
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40 Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request, p. 28 
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1. Public diplomacy should have higher prioritization in the foreign policy 
process.  Public diplomacy officials should be included in high-level 
meetings so they can inform fellow policymakers about public opinion 
abroad.  Being part of the decision-making process can only have positive 
effects on an official’s ability to devise a useful strategy to win foreign 
support. 
2. American officials must engage more regularly with foreign media.  
Limiting contact with foreign media to high-profile trips abroad makes the 
interaction seem too much like a publicity stunt.  If the American President 
or Secretary of State were more accessible to foreign media, it would lead 
to increased quantity and quality of coverage. 
3. The State Department must dramatically improve its training of 
ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers.  As it stands now, ambassadors 
receive just a few weeks of training before deployment, and little attention 
is given to public diplomacy.  As a spokesperson for America, an 
ambassador should have daily interaction with the press in her/his host 
country.  S/he should be the strongest advocate of grassroots public 
diplomacy, arranging visits between American and foreign businesspeople, 
policymakers, academics and students.   
4. The government must continue to work closely with American 
multinational corporations. Embassies and consulates should work to foster 
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good relationships with American companies abroad, forging partnerships 
to expose locals to American culture.   
5. Money is a crucial factor for public diplomacy, as with any government 
entity.  Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes worked hard to increase 
Congressional appropriations for public diplomacy.  According to the 
Congressional Research Service, funding nearly doubled during her two-
year tenure at State.  Yet it remains just over 1% of the total State 
Department budget, and it pales in comparison with the hundreds of billions 
of dollars appropriated to the Pentagon and supplemental war funding 
packages.  Money could make the most significant difference in educational 
exchanges.  With proper funding, the State Department could work with 
American universities to send more students abroad each year.  If 
embassies abroad provided students with improved information and 
opportunities to interact with the local culture, it would foster a sense of 
engagement for American students abroad.41 
6. Improving credibility should be addressed at the highest levels.  
Dispatching so-called “goodwill ambassadors” gives a human face to 
foreign policy, and establishes credibility.  Indirect approaches should also 
be adopted, using our allies to carry our messages. 
7. The government must stabilize the organization of public diplomacy.  
Adjustments should be made as needed, but a vast overhaul of the entire 
                                                 
41 See Appendix pp. 37-8 
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system, such as those that took place in the 1950’s, 1970’s and 1990’s, 
interrupt public diplomacy efforts.  Just as consistency in messaging is 
important, consistency within the organization would have a positive effect.   
8. Academia must make room for the study of public diplomacy.  
Quantitatively study is challenging because of the time lag between the 
collection of data and its release.  If public diplomacy is more critically 
analyzed and studied by researchers and students, it will have a trickle-up 
effect within the policy establishment.  When universities produce a class 
of scholars on public diplomacy, the government must utilize their unique 
knowledge through recruiting them as Foreign Service officers and policy 
planners.  
9. The government should use its greatest resource: the American people.  
There are 300 million potential citizen diplomats living in the United 
States.  Efforts must be made to educate Americans about the impact they 
can have by taking part in foreign exchange programs.  Public diplomacy 
can take place in average American homes—by hosting an international 
student, by keeping an international pen-pal, by blogging about daily life.  
The data show that the opinion of Americans as people remains more 
popular than America as a government.  We must use this circumstance to 
our advantage. 
 
 37 
VI. Conclusion 
  In various Middle East countries, heavy government control over print and 
broadcast media continues to obfuscate American messages.  The only solution is 
to use a more indirect approach, relying on allies and proxies and private sector 
partners to deliver messages on behalf of America.42  It is far better to continue 
exposing foreign audiences to American culture, even if it must be done through a 
moderator, than to allow unfriendly governments to distort American policies.  
Indirect approaches shore up credibility and invite multiple players to take part in 
the public diplomacy process. 
An important collaboration took place in late 2007 between the Department 
of State and the Walt Disney Company.  A team from Disney created a seven-
minute video entitled “Portraits of America,” which is now played on a loop at 
every U.S. consulate and American point of entry.  Thousands of people see this 
video each day as they stand in line waiting to receive visas or to go through 
customs.  The video itself is simple—smiling faces, quaint scenery, sweeping 
music—but it paints an important picture of America as a welcoming place, open 
to visitors from anywhere in the world.  This collaboration is important for two 
reasons.  First, it positively portrays America and seeks to make visitors feel 
welcome before they have even left home.  Second, this kind of partnership 
between the public and private sector is the best solution for the funding and 
organizational problems public diplomacy faces within the government.  Disney 
                                                 
42 Lord, Carnes. ibid, p. 111 
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generously donated its time, money and talent, and produced a product that is now 
a part of every visitor’s American experience.  Engaging the private sector in 
public diplomacy is not only efficient, but will serve the long-term purpose of 
fostering further collaboration, thus involving America’s best and brightest in the 
process.     
The greatest hindrance to public diplomacy—disregarding a lack of funding 
and organizational instability—will continue to be the disagreement over whether 
or not public diplomacy is effective or important.  Not until domestic support is 
built for public diplomacy will its efforts realize their full potential.  As with most 
domestic issues, there is a double-edged sword involved.  Politicians do not want 
to support a practice unless they believe it works; however, poorly funded and 
badly organized efforts are never given a full-faith opportunity to demonstrate 
what they can accomplish.  Like so many things, effective public diplomacy 
depends on allocating the appropriate resources, and allocation relies on 
commitment.  In a well-known game theory scenario in international relations, 
when a nation commits to a task, the outcome is a function of relative effort.  Even 
though the game itself, in an article by Bruce Beuno de Mesquita and others, 
studies conflict, the same principle holds true: “If the choice is to fight, then 
leaders decide how many of their available resources they are prepared to commit 
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to the war effort.”43  Similarly, if America wants to commit to a credible and 
effective public diplomacy, it must decide what portion of its resources it is 
willing to allocate.  If the policy community and the academic community would 
collaborate to give clear examples of when public diplomacy has been successful, 
American politicians would perhaps be more inclined to support such allocation 
and commitment.  Unlike economic or military affairs, there is little hard data 
associated with public diplomacy, which makes it seem intangible.  Accurately 
measuring its effects would have a tremendous impact, but collecting so much 
data would require intense collaboration between the government and scholars.  
Joseph Nye, who is a leading scholar on soft power, writes that soft power is “not 
just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the 
United States wants.”44  The potential of public diplomacy must not be 
underestimated, and it deserves to be studied.  In the meantime, those who believe 
in the power of public diplomacy must continue in its advocacy.  Engaging 
Americans in public diplomacy will create many positive outcomes: Americans 
taking interest in their country, foreign audiences having a more favorable view of 
the American government, and a restored sense of positive American influence 
worldwide.  
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VII. Appendix 
1. Budget breakdown of State and Foreign Operations—the item line of special 
interest to this essay are in bold and italics. 
Department of State and Other International Programs  
(In millions of dollars) 
Estimate   2005Actual 2006 2007 
Spending      
   Discretionary Budget Authority:     
      Diplomatic and Consular Programs 4,202 4,304 4,652
      Education and Cultural Exchange Programs 378 426 474
      Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance 1,504 1,470 1,540
      International Peacekeeping 483 1,022 1,135
      International Organizations 1,166 1,151 1,269
      Economic Support Fund 2,391 2,621 3,215
      Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 1,374 1,975 2,894
      International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 493 472 796
      Andean Counterdrug Initiative 725 727 722
      Migration and Refugee Assistance 764 783 833
      Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining 
Programs 384 406 449
      Foreign Military Financing 4,746 4,465 4,551
          Legislative proposal, Conflict Response Fund — — 75
      Assistance for Eastern Europe and Baltic States 308 357 274
      Assistance for Independent States of the Former 
Soviet Union 462 509 441
      Child Survival and Health 1,573 1,569 1,433
      Development Assistance 1,445 1,488 1,261
      International Disaster and Famine Assistance 466 361 349
      USAID Operating Expenses 610 624 679
      Broadcasting Board of Governors 594 644 672
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Department of State and Other International Programs  
(In millions of dollars) 
Estimate   2005Actual 2006 2007 
      Millennium Challenge Corporation 1,488 1,752 3,000
      Export-Import Bank 106 97 58
      Overseas Private Investment Corporation −180 −160 −160
      Peace Corps 317 319 337
      Multilateral Development Banks 1,219 1,277 1,329
      Other State and International Programs 1,494 1,521 1,583
      Food Aid (USDA PL 480 Title II) (non-add) 1,173 1,139 1,219
   Total, Discretionary budget authority 28,512 30,182 33,859
    Memorandum: Budget authority from enacted 
supplementals  4,737 162 —
   Total, Discretionary outlays 29,808 30,762 32,384
   Total, Mandatory outlays −2,306 −2,209 −417
   Total, Outlays 27,502 28,553 31,967
Credit activity      
   Direct Loan Disbursements:     
      Export-Import Bank 262 65 26
      All other programs 876 706 654
   Total, Direct loan disbursements 1,138 771 680
   Guaranteed Loan Commitments:     
      Export-Import Bank 9,317 12,630 13,829
      All other programs 2,477 1,675 1,748
   Total, Guaranteed loan commitments 11,794 14,305 15,577
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